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Abstract
Paying insurers risk-adjusted prices for covering different individuals can correct selection incentives and
induce the market to provide optimal insurance policies. To calculate the optimal risk-adjusted prices we
need to know (a) what the optimal policies are; (b) how much they cost; and (c) how competitive the market
is. We examine these issues in a model with spatial heterogeneity and adverse selection. Market equilibrium
is characterized, and delivery of the socially optimal insurance policies is possible, as long as providers are
paid risk-adjusted fees for each individual they serve. When the payment can be made on the basis of an
individual’s risk, it should be sufﬁcient to cover the expected cost of the socially optimal policy for that
person, plus a mark-up. If payments can be made only on the basis of a partially informative signal, the
optimal risk-based payments should be adjusted according to a simple linear transformation, identiﬁed by
Glazer and McGuire [Glazer, J., McGuire, T., 2000. Optimal risk adjustment of health insurance premiums:
an application to managed care. American Economic Review 90 (4), 1055–1071].
© 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
JEL classiﬁcation: I11; I18
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1. Introduction
In the hope of providing stronger efﬁciency incentives and ensuring greater responsiveness
to demand, many public services have recently been contracted out to private providers. For
example, by July 2005, 12% of Medicare enrollees in the US obtained health insurance coverage
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through private sector Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs),1 while a number of states
have implemented school voucher schemes and other means of increasing school choice. In these
kinds of markets, private providers are paid by an intermediary purchaser (the government) for
each individual they serve. Alternatively, individuals may be allocated a voucher with a speciﬁed
face value, that can be used to purchase services offered by a provider. A problem that many
health economists have identiﬁed, and in recent years begun to model, arises when individuals
are heterogeneous. If a uniform price is paid to providers on behalf of individuals they serve, or if
vouchers have a uniform face value, incentives may arise for providers to restrict access of certain
(high cost) individuals to services. If providers are required to offer a single standardized bundle
of services, then non-discrimination and open enrollment regulations might mitigate against such
actions.2 Ontheotherhand,individualheterogeneitytypicallymeansprovisionofasinglebundle
of services for all types of individuals is inefﬁcient. Individuals at risk of heart disease need
cardiovascularsurgeonsintheirhealthplan,andparentsofchildrenwithlearningdisabilitieswant
special education services (Biglaiser and Ma, 2003). There is then a concern that if providers are
afforded the ﬂexibility of offering different bundles of services, they might strategically alter the
mixnotsomuchtoefﬁcientlymatchconsumerpreferences,buttoinduceunproﬁtableindividuals
to seek services elsewhere, while attracting more proﬁtable clients.
Such selection-induced marketing policies could result in costly distortions to equilibrium
service bundles. One response is for the purchaser to alter the prices paid on behalf of different
consumers,inthehopeofreducingthevariationinproﬁtabilityacrossindividuals.Thisisreferred
to as risk adjustment in the health economics literature (e.g., Newhouse, 1996). Much of the risk
adjustment literature has been empirical in nature, searching for good predictors of individual
health care spending.3 But if different individuals would optimally consume different bundles
of services, then predicting the cost of providing a given bundle to individuals with different
characteristics is not necessarily enough information for the purchaser to optimally set prices.
This paper contributes to a growing literature on “optimal” risk adjustment mechanisms. We
approach the question of how to optimally differentiate prices paid to providers on behalf of het-
erogeneous consumers in four steps. First, we ask what bundles of goods a social planner would
directly allocate to the different consumers in maximizing social welfare. This optimization is
performed under the incentive compatibility constraints imposed by the requirement that con-
sumers can freely choose between the bundles that are provided. The second step is to model the
equilibrium behavior of providers when they are paid a ﬁxed uniform price for all individuals.
In the recent literature on managed care behavior (Frank et al., 2000, hereafter FGM, Glazer
and McGuire, 2002, hereafter GM02) providers are assumed to allocate resources by choos-
ing good-speciﬁc shadow prices when competing. We show that this neither is consistent with
proﬁt maximization (Ma, 2003 also makes this point), nor does it necessarily respect incentive
compatibility constraints imposed by open enrollment rules.4
1 http://www.kff.org/medicare/upload/Medicare-Advantage-April-20050Fact-Sheet.pdf, although this percentage is
expected to risk in 2006 due to changes in reimbursement rules. Murgolo (2002), reported that the proportion was
17% in 2000, and that in fact, conditional on having (geographic) access to an HMO, 25% of eligible individuals got
insurance coverage through such an organization at that time.
2 Shen and Ellis (2002) present a model in which health plans can perfectly cream skim—that is, they can identify
costly patients and deny them coverage.
3 See Newhouse (2002, chapter 6) and Van de Ven and Ellis (2000) for a review of this literature.
4 Of course, some providers are non-proﬁt, but this in itself should not imply that they offer allocatively inefﬁcient
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Third, assuming the purchaser can perfectly identify an individual’s relevant characteristics
(his or her “type”), then given the equilibrium behavior of providers, prices can be differentiated
by individual type to maximize the purchaser’s objective function. The optimal prices might be
called “optimal type-based prices.” Finally, the fourth step is to recognize that the purchaser will
genericallyhaveincompleteinformationonindividualcharacteristics,andtoaddressthestatistical
issue of how payments should be related to that incomplete information. The statistical correction
of Glazer and McGuire (2000), hereafter GM00, is used for this purpose.5
In the model in the current paper individuals differ on two dimensions: ﬁrst with respect to
their risk of suffering bad health, and second on a continuous spatial dimension. There is no ex
ante or ex post moral hazard (i.e., an individual’s ex ante risk of bad health is exogenous, and her
ex post health status is observable), and a representative insurance policy is deﬁned by the quality
of health care services provided under the policy in alternative health states. Consistent with the
recent literature, health care is multidimensional, and insurance policies can promise high quality
of some kinds of services (e.g., pediatrics), but low quality of others (e.g., mental health). The
idea is that the quality of, say pediatric care, offered under an insurance policy is determined by
the stafﬁng and management policies of the insurer, and this level of quality is deﬁned in the
insurance package. Alternative packages might restrict access to certain physicians or ancillary
services, thereby offering a potentially different quality of service.
Later,whenweconsiderrisk-adjustedpayments,wewillassumethatproviderscannotdirectly
differentiatebetween(i.e.,select)individualsonthebasisoftheirobservablecharacteristics,even
if a purchaser conditions reimbursement rates on such characteristics. For example, we will allow
a purchaser to reimburse a provider on the basis of the age and gender of an individual, but we
will assume that providers cannot (i) deny enrollment to an individual based on age and gender;
or (ii) explicitly differentiate the quality of services provided to individuals on the basis of their
ageandgender.Thisdoesnotmeanthataninsurercannotindirectly(inequilibrium),differentiate
between (i.e., select) individuals according to their age/gender characteristics: a policy with good
maternity and pediatric care but poor geriatric care would be attractive to young adults, but not
to the aged. We simply assume that a provider cannot explicitly preclude the aged from choosing
such a policy. Similarly, a policy with good aged care facilities would be more attractive to the
aged, but the provider must allow the young to choose it if they wish.
On the supply side there are two spatially differentiated, but otherwise identical, service
providers/insurers.6 There is no price competition, and providers are paid a pre-determined
(possibly differentiated) fee per enrollee.7 Providers attract (deter) consumers by increasing
(decreasing) the quality of the bundles offered, but they must respect incentive compatibility
constraints imposed by the requirement that each individual is permitted to select any bundle
offered.
We ﬁrst characterize the socially optimal provision of insurance under both full informa-
tion and asymmetric information, in which case incentive compatibility constraints must be
5 Glazer and McGuire model the insurance industry as perfectly competitive in the sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz
(1976).Ifthepurchasercancostlesslyobserveindividuals’types,thentheoptimaltype-basedpricesjustcoverthecostsof
providing the socially optimal health services to each risk type separately. However, if payments to providers can instead
be made on the basis of a signal that is only partially informative about an individual’s underlying risk type, the optimal
risk-adjusted payments either under- or over-pay compared with the optimal type-based prices. Glazer and McGuire’s
paper is primarily concerned with this statistical issue.
6 It would be straightforward to generalize the model to n>2 providers located on a circle as in Salop (1979).
7 Thispaymentcouldbeimplementedbygivingeachindividualavoucherwithagivenfacevalue(possiblydifferentiated
across consumers) that can be used only to purchase a bundle of services from one of the providers.W. Jack / Journal of Health Economics 25 (2006) 908–926 911
respected. Our simple speciﬁcation is general enough to admit the possibility of socially opti-
mal insurance policies that differ across individuals. This seems to be an important aspect of
the environment that is missing from GM00’s seminal contribution, in which the optimal insur-
ance policy is the same for all risk types, but is consistent with the authors’ more recent (2002)
contribution. In our simple framework, the full information pair of socially optimal insurance
policies is never incentive compatible, as high-risk individuals wish to be covered by the pol-
icy for low-risks. Under conditions of asymmetric information the policies are thus distorted:
the generosity of the policy designed for high-risks is increased – too much is spent on high-
risks, and the generosity of the policy for low-risks is reduced – too little is spent on them –
and the mix of services offered to low-risks is also distorted – they get the “wrong mix” of
services.
Nextwederivetheequilibriuminsurancepoliciesofferedbythemarket,againunderconditions
of both full and incomplete information. Our assumption about how plans compete is different
to that in the recent literature on HMO markets of, e.g., FGM, and GM02. The model of these
papers assumes that the level of service quality in deﬁned by setting the marginal beneﬁt of the
service equal to a strategically chosen shadow price. This shadow price is the same for all policies
offered by the insurer, so that the marginal expected beneﬁt of each service is equated across
individuals with different policies. Although this sounds efﬁcient, there are two problems with
such an assumption about ﬁrm behavior. First, a set of policies characterized by a given vector of
shadow prices does not in general maximize the ﬁrm’s proﬁts, and second the policies offered to
differentindividualsusingtheshadowpricingrulearenotnecessarilyincentivecompatible.Inour
model, ﬁrms choose the components of insurance policies directly (without being constrained to
equate marginal expected beneﬁts across individuals) to maximize proﬁts, and when appropriate,
these policies are constrained to be incentive compatible.
Having characterized the equilibrium outcome, it is then a relatively simple matter to specify
the payments that implement the (full- and information constrained-) social optimum. These
optimal type-speciﬁc payments cover the costs of providing the socially optimal bundle to each
type of individual, plus a mark-up over cost. This mark-up, equal to the unit travel cost parameter,
is necessary when providers have some market power and consumers cannot all costlessly switch
from one provider to another. When payments must be based on imperfectly informative signals,
the type-speciﬁc optimal payments need to be adjusted using the linear transformation proposed
by GM00.
Biglaiser and Ma (2003) present a model that is close to that of the current paper. As in
the current paper, consumers are spatially differentiated, as well as having different risks or
types. They consider the performance of different market structures – in particular examin-
ing the issue of “carve outs” in health insurance provision – but do not address the question
of differential (i.e., risk-adjusted) payments, except tangentially in their conclusion. Similarly,
Olivella and Vera-Hern´ andez (2005) model equilibrium in spatially differentiated insurance
markets, but focus more on existence issues than risk adjustment. Finally, Jack (2001) con-
sidered the nature of equilibrium in a model with spatially differentiated consumers, but under
the constraint that insurance providers set a uniform price and allowed individuals to buy as
much insurance as they wished at that price. The primary focus of that paper, however, was on
the structure of optimal payments based on endogenous signals (in particular, actual spending
levels).
In the next section we present a description of consumer preferences and costs in a model
with two types of health services and heterogeneous risks. In Section 3 we characterize socially
optimal insurance policies under full and incomplete information. Section 4 characterizes market912 W. Jack / Journal of Health Economics 25 (2006) 908–926
equilibrium in the presence of spatial consumer heterogeneity with uniform pricing (i.e., no risk
adjustment). In Section 5 optimal risk-adjusted payments are derived, ﬁrst under the assumption
thatindividualcharacteristicsareobservablebythepurchaser,andthenwhentypesareimperfectly
observable. Section 6 concludes.
2. Preferences and costs
There are two health care services, x and y, and two possible states of nature, g (good health)
and b (bad health). The probability that state b occurs is θ, and the probability that state g occurs
is 1−θ. We refer to θ, which can differ across the population, as the “type” of an individual.
This is one source of individual heterogeneity; we will introduce a second locational dimension
of heterogeneity in Section 4. Service y – thought of as acute care – is only useful in the bad state,
and in that state provides beneﬁt ψ(y). Service x – “regular” health care – provides beneﬁts ξ(x)i n
both states. However, we allow the beneﬁt of service x to be state-dependent, being ξb(x) in state
b and ξg(x) in state g, with ξ 
b(x) ≤ ε 
g(x)—i.e., in the bad state the productivity of regular health
care may be lower than in the good state. The expected beneﬁt (compared with no insurance)—of
an insurance policy that provides a bundle of services P=(x, y)i s
u(x, y; θ) = ζ(x, θ) + θψ(y). (1)
If the beneﬁt of service x is state-independent, then ζ(x, θ)=ξ(x). This is the case considered by
GM00. Otherwise, ζ(x, θ)=θξb(x)+(1−θ)ξg(x).
To permit the derivation of simple expressions for optimal and equilibrium outcomes, from
timetotimeweshallplacefurtherrestrictionsonthebeneﬁtfunctions,andassumethatψ(y)=lny,
ξg(x)=αlnx, and ξb(x)=βlnx, with α>β. The expected utility of a bundle P=(x, y) then sim-
pliﬁes to
u(x, y; θ) = γ(θ)lnx + θ lny
where γ(θ)=α(1−θ)+βθ.
The expected expenditure associated with an insurance plan (x, y) is denoted
m(x, y; θ) = x + θy.
We deﬁne the maximal beneﬁt of a policy with expected expenditure m as
υ(m; θ) = max
x,y
u(x, y; θ)s .t.x + θy = m.
F o rag i v e nθ, the bundle (x(m), y(m)) that solves this problem deﬁnes a functional relationship
between x and y. Write this as x = ˆ x(y; θ). In the case of log utility, ˆ x(y; θ) = γ(θ)y.
Any plan (ˆ x(y; θ),y ) provided to a θ-type individual maximizes her expected utility given the
expected cost of the policy, and is efﬁcient in this sense. For a given value of θ any efﬁcient policy
is determined solely by the value of y chosen. Fig. 1 illustrates the loci of efﬁcient plans in the
log utility case for two types of individuals, θH >θL. (Note that γ (θ)=−(α−β)<0. Of course,
when α=β, the two lines coincide.)
With log utility, the expected cost of an efﬁcient policy with acute care level y is
c(y; θ) = γ(θ)y + θy
= ˆ γ(θ)y
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Fig. 1. The line ˆ x(y; θH) is the locus of plans that provide an individual of type θH with maximal expected utility for a
given level of expected cost. Similarly, ˆ x(y; θL) is the locus of such plans for θL types, where θL <θH. The curved lines
are indifference curves for each type. At the surplus maximizing plans, PL and PH, both types have y* =1, but in general
x*(θH)<x*(θL).
where ˆ γ(θ) ≡ θ + γ(θ). If a plan’s beneﬁt levels are increased through a marginal increase in
the quality of the acute service, matched by an efﬁcient increase in the quality of regular care,
the incremental cost is c1(y; θ) = ˆ γ(θ), constant for given θ. We assume that α−β<1, so that
the marginal cost of expanding plan quality is higher for individuals with greater risk: ˆ γ (θ) =
1 − (α − β) > 0. (Note that this is trivially satisﬁed in the case that α=β.)
Finally, with log utility the expected utility earned by a θ-type individual insured with an
efﬁcient plan with acute service quality y is
ω(y, θ) = u(ˆ x(y; θ),y ,θ )
= Γ(θ) + ˆ γ(θ)lny
(3)
where Γ(θ)=γ(θ)l nγ(θ). The marginal utility of increased plan quality is ω1(y, θ) = ˆ γ(θ)/y,
which is increasing in θ under the assumption that α−β<1, i.e., ω12 =(1−(α−β))/y>0. That
is, higher risk individuals value increased plan quality more than lower risk individuals.
3. Socially optimal plans
Inthissectionofthepaperandthenextweassumethatθ cantakeononeoftwovalues,θL <θH,
and that the proportion of θL-types is ρ∈(0, 1). We ﬁrst characterize the pair of socially optimal
plans when plans can be assigned to individuals as a function of their types. We then characterize
incentive compatible socially optimal plans. We note that the introduction of locational hetero-
geneity across consumers in Section 4 will not alter the socially optimal plans (under either full
or incomplete information), since we will assume then that travel costs are linear and additively
separable from the beneﬁt, u(.), derived from insurance.914 W. Jack / Journal of Health Economics 25 (2006) 908–926
3.1. Full information
The expected surplus associated with a plan (x, y) covering a θ-type individual is
V(x, y; θ) = u(x, y; θ) − m(x, y; θ).
The surplus maximizing plan must be efﬁcient (in the sense above), and is therefore characterized
by y*(θ) that solves
ω1(y; θ) = c1(y; θ). (4)
With log utility, this reduces to
y∗ = 1,
and the surplus maximizing level of regular care is
x∗(θ) = ˆ x(1,θ )
= γ(θ).
When the value of regular care is state-independent, x* =α, independent of θ. The case of state-










When α=β, the optimal plans for both high- and low-risk individuals are identical, and hence
trivially incentive compatible. However, it is clear from Fig. 1 that when α>β, all individuals –
both high- and low-risk – will prefer the plan PL to plan PH. This is simply because both plans
promise the same quality of acute care, but PH provides lower quality regular care than PL.8
To characterize the incentive compatible socially optimal pair of plans (P 
L,P  
H) we anticipate
the “no-distortion at the top” result that P 
H will be efﬁcient, that is
P 
H = (ˆ x(yH,θ H),y H)
for some yH. Also, from Fig. 1 it is clear that any incentive compatible pair of plans must provide
lower quality acute care to low-risk individuals, yL <yH. Thus, for any value yH, and for any
yL <yH deﬁne ˜ x(yL,y H) as satisfying
ω(yH,θ H) = u(˜ x, yL,θ H).
The bundle (˜ x, yL) gives the same expected utility to a θH-type individual as the efﬁcient policy
with acute care service quality yH.˜ x(yL,y H) is the highest quality of regular care that can be
provided under a plan for low-risk individuals in conjunction with acute care quality yL that will
ensure that high-risk individuals prefer the efﬁcient plan designed for them, (ˆ x, yH).
8 This result is not as asymmetric as it might seem. High risk individuals use acute care more often than low risks, while
both types use regular care equally often. Thus, the expected quality of acute care is higher for high risks than for low
risks.W. Jack / Journal of Health Economics 25 (2006) 908–926 915
The expected cost of the plan (˜ x, yL)i s
˜ c(yL,y H; θL) = ˜ x(yL,y H) + θLyL (6)







Similarly, the expected utility earned by a low-risk individual insured by the plan (˜ x, yL)i s








To ﬁnd the optimal pair of incentive compatible plans, we solve
max
yL,yH
ρ[˜ ω(yL,y H; θL) − ˜ c(yL,y H; θL)] + (1 − ρ)[ω(yH,θ H) − c(yH,θ H)].
If (y 
L,y  
H) solves this problem, then the optimal plans are P 
L = (˜ x(y 
L,y  
H),y  
L) and PH =
(ˆ x(y 
H),y  
H). The ﬁrst order conditions for (y 
L,y  
H) are
θL − types : ˜ ω1(yL,y H; θL) = ˜ c1(yL,y H; θL) (8)
and





[˜ ω2(yL,y H; θL) − ˜ c2(yL,y H; θL)].
(9)
The square-bracketed term in (9) is positive, so the incentive compatible social optimum is
characterized by excessive but efﬁcient spending for high-risk individuals, and sub-optimal and
inefﬁcient spending on low-risks. That is,
y 
H >y ∗
H and x 




L and ˆ x(y 
L,θ L) <x  
L <x ∗
L
This result is illustrated in Fig. 2 for the case of log utility. The full-information socially optimal
plans PL and PH are shown as before. Also shown is an iso-surplus curve for low-risks. This
9 With log utility, the expressions for these derivatives are
∂˜ c
∂yL













which can be seen to have the reported signs. The marginal effects have these signs as long as the indifference curves in
Fig. 1 satisfy the single crossing property.
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Fig. 2. Socially optimal incentive compatible plans, P 
L and P 
H.
curve is ﬂat whenever x=x*(θL), it is vertical whenever y=y* =1, and along the efﬁciency locus
ˆ x(y, θL) it has the same slope as a θL-type indifference curve (which is steeper than the θH-type
indifference curve through the same point). The optimal pair of incentive compatible plans, P 
L
and P 
H must be on the same θH-type indifference curve, and P 
L must maximize low-risk surplus
subject to being on such an indifference curve. Thus, in order to induce high-risks to choose the
plan designed for them, both plans are distorted. First, the generosity of the plan for high-risks in
increased, although it remains efﬁcient (P 
H is to the north-east of PH, but on the ˆ x(y, θH) locus);
second,thegenerosityoftheplanforlow-risksisreduced,andthemixofservicesprovidedunder
this plan is distorted away from acute care (P 
L is to the south-west of PL, and to the right of the
ˆ x(y, θL) locus).
Finally, we deﬁne ω 
L and ω 
H to be the utility earned by θL- and θH-types, respectively, at the
social optimum:
ω 
L = u(x 
L,y  
L; θL) and ω 
H = u(x 
H,y  
H; θH). (10)
From Fig. 2 it is clear that high-risks earn higher expected utility at the social optimum under
asymmetric information, and low-risks earn lower expected utility. Also, expected expenditure is
higher for high-risks, and lower for low-risks. Note that the lower expenditure on low-risks is in
spite of the fact that the policy they are allocated, P 
L, does not provide the given (lower) level of
expected utility at minimum cost (i.e., P 




The government’s objective is to implement socially optimal insurance coverage by paying
private providers on behalf of individuals who enroll in their plans. Equivalently, the government
endows each individual with a voucher that can be used to purchase insurance from a privateW. Jack / Journal of Health Economics 25 (2006) 908–926 917
provider. In this paper we assume a horizontally differentiated market structure, and introduce
a second dimension of consumer heterogeneity. A number of papers on risk adjustment have
adopted such an approach, including Biglaiser and Ma (2003), GM02, Jack (2001), and Olivella
and Vera-Hern´ andez (2005). GM00, in which consumers differ only by risk type, is a notable
exception. Incorporating a horizontal or spatial dimension of heterogeneity into the model allows
us to investigate providers’ incentives to expand or contract the size of the market they serve in a
meaningful sense. This in turn means that risk-adjusted payments not only can serve the purpose
ofalteringtheallocativepropertiesofaRothschild–Stiglitzequilibriuminthepresenceofadverse
selection as in GM00, but also can be used to reduce providers’ incentives to deter participation
of certain individuals.11
Individuals of each risk type are distributed uniformly on the interval [0, 1]. There are two
providers with identical cost functions, one at δ=0 and the other at δ=1.AθJ-type individual
(J=L,H)atpositionδ∈[0,1]whoconsumesabundle(x,y)deliveredbyprovider0hasnetutility
U0(x, y, δ; θJ) = u(x, y; θJ) − tδ
where t is a unit travel cost. If she acquires such a bundle from provider 1 her net utility is
U1(x, y, δ; θJ) = u(x, y; θJ) − t(1 − δ).
As long as u(x, y; θJ)>tδ, a J-type individual at δ will prefer to be served by provider 0 than to go
without the services. We assume that t is small enough that the optimal utilities deﬁned by (5) or
(10) are sufﬁciently high as to make it socially optimal for all individuals to be served. That is,
universal coverage of the population is welfare maximizing.
To start with, we assume the providers are paid a single price or fee, r, per individual to whom
theyprovideservices(alternatively,thevalueofthevoucheristhesameforallindividuals),which
isﬁnancedthroughnon-distortionarytaxation,thedistributionofwhichisnotmodelledexplicitly







all individuals who request either policy.13
Our assumption about the way in which providers choose insurance policies is different to
that made in some recent models of HMO behavior such as FGM, and GM02. In those models,
providers are assumed to choose a vector of shadow prices q which is used to ration health care
across individuals. Adapting the GM02 model to our environment, the marginal expected beneﬁt
of service x provided to each covered individual is equated to the shadow price qx chosen by
11 In a perfectly competitive model, expected proﬁts per participant are zero in equilibrium, so providers are indifferent
to expansions or contractions in demand on the extensive margin. This indifference seems at odds with the practical
concerns of health insurance providers.
A related advantage of the model over that of perfect competition, helpfully suggested by a referee, is that the equilibrium
in our model is more robust. In a Rothschild–Stiglitz equilibrium all individuals are indifferent between purchasing
insurance from all providers. If an insurer can actively discriminate between risk types at some small cost, then it can
induce all the bad risks to switch to another insurer. However, in a model with horizontal heterogeneity, a small amount
of active discrimination will induce only a small number of switches, since most consumers are not indifferent between
providers.
12 If travel costs are assumed to be pecuniary, then our model speciﬁcation effectively assumes the marginal utility of
income is unity for all individuals, so the distribution of the tax burden has no impact on social welfare.
13 We assume that providers cannot make insurance policies contingent on an individual’s location.918 W. Jack / Journal of Health Economics 25 (2006) 908–926
the insurer, thereby equalizing the marginal expected beneﬁt of this service across the plan’s
clients.14
However, as noted by Ma (2003), such a strategy is in general not proﬁt maximizing: an
insurer cares not about Pareto efﬁciency, but about proﬁts. In addition, we show below that such
a strategy does not necessarily yield an incentive compatible pair of policies, so cannot constitute
an equilibrium. To begin, we analyze the equilibrium under complete information.
4.1. Full information equilibrium
Weassumeprovidershavefullinformationaboutrisktypes,andcanperfectlydiscriminate.The
twoproviderseffectivelycompeteintwomarketsseparately—theθL-marketandtheθH-market.In
the θJ-type market, if provider 0 offers a policy that provides gross utilityω0
J and provider 1 offers
one providing gross utility ω1
J, then as long as ω0
J + ω1
J ≥ t all θJ-type individuals will participate
by choosing a bundle from one or other of the providers. The proportion who choose ﬁrm 0’s
bundle is 1/2[1 + (ω0
J − ω1
J)/t], and the proportion served by ﬁrm 1 is 1/2[1 + (ω1
J − ω0
J)/t].
Because the ﬁrms face no incentive compatibility constraints they have no reason to offer




J) for some y1
J. The insurer can attract more θJ-type consumers by increasing the
quality of services offered to them, but faces no incentive to distort the mix of services. Thus,
ﬁrm 1’s problem is to choose values of y1
L and y1
H to maximize its proﬁts, taking as ﬁxed ﬁrm 0’s
choices of y0
L and y0






























Firm 0’s proﬁt is deﬁned similarly. Given ﬁrm 0’s policy choice in the θJ-market, ﬁrm 1’s best
response satisﬁes the ﬁrst order condition
[r − c(y1
J,θ J)]ω1(y1
J,θ J) = c1(y1
J,θ J)[t + ω(y1
J,θ J) − ω0
J]. (11)
At a symmetric equilibrium, y1
J = y0
J ≡ yE
J , characterized by
ω1(yJ,θ J) =
tc1(yJ,θ J)




14 In the ﬁrst part of GM02 there is no uncertainty, and individuals have heterogeneous preferences. Shadow prices
are then used to allocate quantities of different health services across the individuals. In the second part of the paper
(as detailed in the appendix thereto), there is uncertainty, and shadow prices are used to allocate services ex post. Thus,
an insurance policy, under uncertainty, promises different levels of each service in different health states. The model of
the current paper, although it is in an environment of uncertainty, is formally closer to the ﬁrst part of GM02, since an
insurance policy provides given levels of the two kinds of medical care that are the same across health states—i.e., there
is no ex post rationing of care. It is for this reason that we think of the components of the insurance policy – x and y –a s
measuring the quality of physicians and/or facilities the plan employs. The insured individual enjoys the same quality of
care independent of the health state.W. Jack / Journal of Health Economics 25 (2006) 908–926 919




r − ˆ γJyE
J
,




t + ˆ γJ
(13)
where ˆ γJ = ˆ γ(θJ). The corresponding quality of regular care is ˆ x(yE
J ,θ J). Considering, for exam-
ple, service y, in equilibrium the ratio of the marginal expected beneﬁt of acute care provided to











t + ˆ γL
t + ˆ γH

< 1.
since ˆ γH > ˆ γL.15
Finally, note from (13) that the quality of acute care is lower for high-risks than for low-risks.
These results hold even when the beneﬁt of regular medical care is state-independent, i.e., even
when α=β. However, recall our observation above that any incentive compatible pair of policies
must provide lower quality acute care to low-risk individuals. It is immediately clear that under
asymmetric information condition (12) cannot characterize the equilibrium policies provided by
the market.
4.2. Equilibrium under incentive constraints
If insurers cannot discriminate between risk types, the policies they offer must be incentive
compatible. To characterize the equilibrium outcome we employ the cost and utility functions
deﬁned in (6) and (7). When ﬁrm 0 offers a pair of incentive compatible policies that yield gross
utilities ω0
L and ω0
H for low- and high-risks, respectively, ﬁrm 1’s aggregate proﬁt from offering



































We denote the quality of regular and acute care at the symmetric Nash equilibrium by xE 
and yE . These values are characterized by the following conditions for the quality of acute care
provided to low- and high-risks, respectively:
θL-types : ˜ ω1 =
t˜ c1
[r − ˜ c]
(14)
15 Footnote 14 explains why we compare marginal expected beneﬁts, and not marginal beneﬁts in each state of nature.920 W. Jack / Journal of Health Economics 25 (2006) 908–926
and










(r − ˜ c)˜ ω2 − t˜ c2




where ˜ c and its derivatives are evaluated at (yE 
L ,y E 
H; θL).
By incorporating the incentive constraint into the insurers’ maximization problems, we have
guaranteed that the policies offered in equilibrium will be incentive compatible, and in particular
that they will satisfy the monotonicity condition yE 
L <y E 
H. We note that if ﬁrms compete by
equating marginal expected beneﬁts to strategically set shadow prices (as suggested in footnote
14), then the purported equilibrium is not necessarily incentive compatible. To see this, consider
the case of log utility again. Equating marginal expected beneﬁts of each service across the two













Such a pair of policies is incentive compatible if and only if
u(xL,y L; θL) ≥ u(xH,y H; θH)
and
u(xH,y H; θH) ≥ u(xL,y L; θL).












must hold if the policies are to be incentive compatible. This simpliﬁes to




The left hand side of this condition is less than one, so if θH/θL >γL/γH (both of which are greater
than one) then the pair of policies cannot satisfy (17), i.e., they cannot be incentive compatible. It
is straightforward to show that in fact, as long as α>(1−β)(θL +θH), this is the case. Note that
this is a sufﬁcient, but not necessary, condition for insurance policies set using shadow prices to
fail to be incentive compatible.
5. Risk adjustments
In the model of market provision above, it was assumed that providers of insurance were paid
a fee r per person served by the government. Equivalently, all individuals received a voucher with
the same face value that could be used to purchase insurance. The question of risk adjustment
concerns the equilibrium and welfare impacts of paying different fees for people with different
characteristics—that is, differentiating the face value of a voucher on the basis of such character-
istics. For example, if the government could pay different fees for θH- and θL-types it might be
able to induce the market to provide the welfare maximizing bundles. We examine this possibil-
ity in Section 5.1. Even if such full information is not available to the government, it might be
able to proﬁtably differentiate between individuals on the basis of a partially informative signalW. Jack / Journal of Health Economics 25 (2006) 908–926 921
(GM00). That is, even if the government cannot identify the underlying risk a given individual
faces, characteristics such as age, gender, race, etc. may be correlated with that underlying risk.
The statistical adjustment to the type-based risk-adjusted prices is considered in Section 5.2.16
We ﬁrst note that even if providers have full information regarding individuals’ types, the
government may wish to differentiate payments by type, simply because the equilibrium in each
type-speciﬁc market may not necessarily correspond to the social optimum. That is, risk adjust-
ment is not necessarily a response to adverse selection. Rather, the costs of providing socially
optimal bundles to different consumer types may well differ, and if prices are not correspond-
ingly differentiated, the bundles delivered in equilibrium will be sub- (or super-) optimal. When
providers have incomplete information about individuals’ types, incentive compatibility con-
straints distort the optimal bundles, changing their costs and the prices necessary to induce their
delivery.
5.1. Risk adjustments based on underlying risk
In this sub-section we assume that the government has full information about risk types, and
can differentiate the fee paid to providers on the basis of an individual’s type. (In the following
subsection we assume the government has a partially informative signal about risk types.) How-
ever, since the government relies on the market to provide insurance, it must implicitly choose
amongst market equilibria. If the market also has full information about risk types, then the full
social optimum can be implemented by a suitable design of the fee structure. However, if the
market operates under conditions of asymmetric information, or indeed if risk-based discrimina-
tion by insurers is prohibited, then the government can only hope to implement an equilibrium
outcome that respects incentive compatibility constraints.17





is, the optimal pair of type-speciﬁc fees, (rH, rL), implements the utility levels, and corresponding
insurance policies, associated with either (4),o r(8) and (9), depending on whether the market
has full information or not. We consider each case in turn.
5.1.1. Optimal risk adjusters when the market has full information




[rJ − c(yJ,θ J)]
(18)
16 In this paper, and much of the literature, the signals upon which risk adjusters are based are exogenous. Jack (2001)
examines how payments should be related to endogenous medical expenditures under conditions of moral harzard.
17 Of course, this is a mildly contrived exercise: if the government had such complete information to make type-speciﬁc
payments to providers, it could simply inform the providers so they no longer faced any IC constraints. More realistic is
a model in which the government receives an observable, exogenous, signal that is correlated with an individual’s type,
and can base the payment to a provider on this. See Glazer and McGuire (2000) and Section 5.2 below.922 W. Jack / Journal of Health Economics 25 (2006) 908–926
for J=L, H. The full information social optimum deﬁned by (4) requires ω1(yJ, θJ)=c1(yJ, θJ),
so the fee for θJ-types should be set to satisfy
r∗
J = c(y∗
J,θ J) + t.
That is, under full information, the risk-adjusted payment for each type should consist of the cost
of efﬁciently providing the optimal bundle, plus the per unit travel cost. In the case of log utility,
this is simply
r∗
J = ˆ γ(θJ) + t.
Why is the risk-adjusted price higher than the cost of the optimal insurance? The answer is
simply that if the price was set at rJ = c(y∗
J,θ J), then a ﬁrm that offered the optimal policy would
earn zero proﬁts on all its θJ-type clients. Reducing the quality of insurance below the optimum
would increase proﬁts on all inframarginal consumers, at the loss of market share corresponding
to an elastic response by marginal consumers, thereby increasing total proﬁts above zero. The
higher is the travel cost parameter t, the lower is this elasticity of demand, and the more proﬁtable
quality reductions will be. Thus, the risk-adjusted price needs to exceed the cost of the optimal
insurancepolicybyacertainmargin(t),andthelesscompetitivethemarket,thehigherthismargin
needs to be.
5.1.2. Optimal risk adjusters when the market has incomplete information
When the market has incomplete information, or is prohibited from explicitly using the infor-
mation it has, about individuals’ risks, the government can only hope to implement the incentive
compatible social optimum, with quality of acute care y 
L and y 
H given by (8) and (9).I ft h e
risk-based payments provided by the government are rL and rH, the market equilibrium satisﬁes
the generalizations of (14) and (15):
θL-types : ˜ ω1 =
t˜ c1
[rL − ˜ c]
(19)
and










(rL − ˜ c)˜ ω2 − t˜ c2




The optimal payment for low-risks (recalling that at the social optimum ˜ ω1 = ˜ c1)i sn o w
r 
L = ˜ c(y 
L,y  
H,θ H) + t,
and that for high-risks satisﬁes
r 
H = c(y 
















H,θ H) + t
substituting for (˜ ω2 − ˜ c2) from (9). Once again, the optimal payment for each type covers the
cost of providing the socially optimal policy for that type, plus the unit travel cost parameter to
account for the strength of competition.W. Jack / Journal of Health Economics 25 (2006) 908–926 923
5.2. Risk adjustments based on signals of risk
GM00 make the observation that if payments are made on the basis of an imperfectly informa-
tive signal of an individual’s type, then it is optimal to over-pay for some signals and underpay on
others. First, following GM00, suppose there is just a single binary signal, s∈{0, 1}, and that qJ
is the probability that a θJ-type individual has signal 1. The signal is informative if 1>qJ >qJ ≥0,
so that θH-types have a higher chance of receiving the signal s=1. If a payment Rs is made on
behalf of individuals with signal s, then the average amounts earned on θH- and θL-types are
¯ rH = qHR1 + (1 − qH)R0 (21)
and
¯ rL = qLR1 + (1 − qL)R0, (22)
respectively. Assuming providers cannot select based on the signal itself,18 ¯ rJ is the expected









bundles, we choose the Rs so that the expected payment for a θJ-type coincides with the optimal
type-based payment, i.e., ¯ rJ = ˆ rJ for J=L, H. Setting the right hand sides of (21) and (22) equal
to ˆ rH and ˆ rL, respectively, and solving for ˆ R0 and ˆ R1,w eﬁ n d
ˆ R0 =




(1 − qL)ˆ rH − (1 − qH)ˆ rL
(qH − qL)
.
These are the same as GM00’s Eqs. (16) and (17). Thus, the method of statistically correcting the
optimal payments is unchanged, but the “conventional” payments (the rJ) are adjusted, to both
account for the strength of competition between ﬁrms (as measured by the travel cost parameter)
and the composition of the optimal insurance policies.
5.2.1. Multiple signals
In practice, there are likely to be multiple signals (age, gender, family history, etc.) that are
correlated with an individual’s type. In addition, these signals need not have binary support. In
general, suppose there are n signals, and signal i has a support Σi,. Let s=(s1, ..., sn)b ea
18 This assumption is made by Glazer and McGuire (2000), who allude to open enrollment requirements in US health
plans and non-discrimination rules. However, its validity is questioned by Newhouse (2002, page 197). Recalling the
discussion in paragraph 6 of the introduction, we believe our assumption is consistent with both positions. Newhouse
notesthatifprovidersarepaidlittleforenrollingchildren,thentheywillhaveanincentivetoprovidelowqualitypediatric
services.Thisispreciselytheassumptionofthecurrentpaper—providerschoosepoliciesgiventhereimbursementratesset
by the purchaser. However, they are not permitted to deny coverage to (families with) children because the reimbursement
rates they attract are low (or for any other reason).924 W. Jack / Journal of Health Economics 25 (2006) 908–926
vector of signals, where si ∈Σi, and suppose fJ(s) is the probability density function of θJ-types
on Σ =Σ1 ×Σ2 ×...×Σn. Also, let R(s) be the payment received by a provider if it delivers







If ˆ rJ is the optimal type-based payment for θJ-types, then any function R(s) for which ¯ rJ = ˆ rJ for
each J implements the social optimum.
For example, consider the case of n=1 but when Σ1 is a closed interval in R. There are two




r0 if s ≥ s0
(23)
then the payment to a provider for an individual is zero if her signal is sufﬁciently low and a
positive constant if it is above a threshold. Alternatively, let
R(s) = β0 + β1s (24)
so the payment is afﬁne in the signal. Since each speciﬁcation has two degrees of freedom,
except in pathological cases it will be possible to ﬁnd a payment schedule within either class that
satisﬁes ˆ rJ = ¯ rJ for J=L, H, where rJ is the optimal type-based payment.19 For example, using
(24),¯ rJ = β0 + β1µJ, where µJ is the expected value of the signal for θJ-types.
For n>2, even within a given class of function, there is no longer a unique payment schedule.
For example, the afﬁne version becomes




which has n+1 degrees of freedom.20 If for each risk type the signals are independent, i.e.,
fJ(s)=fJ1(s1)×...×fJn(sn), then the average payment on behalf of θJ-types is




Any values of β0, ..., βn that solve ¯ rJ = ˆ rJ for J=L, H implement the social optimum. GM02
resolve the indeterminacy when the number of signals is larger than the number of types by
19 One might be induced to choose the smoother version (24) than the step function (23) if the assumption regarding
providers’ inability to select based on the signal is not considered robust.
20 An alternative speciﬁcation of R(s)i s
R(s) =

0i fz . s<s 0
r0 if z.s ≥ s0
where z is a vector of weights that sum to unity, and s0 is a scalar-valued threshold parameter. Under this payment scheme,
the payment to a provider is zero for individuals with signals that are, on (weighted) average, sufﬁciently low, and equal
to s0 for those with a (weighted) average signal above the threshold.W. Jack / Journal of Health Economics 25 (2006) 908–926 925
choosing a solution vector that also has a minimum variance property.21 Alternatively, one might
assumeprovidersarenotriskneutral,orthatatsomecosttheycanselectonthebasisofthesignal,
and from these fundamentals derive optimal payment schedules.22
6. Conclusions
We have used a model that incorporates both spatial heterogeneity and risk heterogeneity to
examine the features of optimal prices paid by a purchasing agency on behalf of individuals with
different underlying characteristics. One contribution of the paper is to specify which insurance
policies are in fact optimal, and how much they cost. Indeed, consumer heterogeneity implies that
a single insurance policy (e.g., uniform national insurance) is not necessarily optimal. We have
shown that, assuming providers cannot explicitly differentiate between individuals (i.e., select
directly on the basis of risk type), then decentralizing the delivery of the (constrained) optimal
insurance policies is possible as long as providers are paid risk-adjusted fees for each individual
they serve. When the payment can be made on the basis of an individual’s underlying risk type,
it should be sufﬁcient to cover the cost of delivering the socially optimal policy for that person,
plus a mark-up over cost. This mark-up, equal to the unit travel cost parameter, accounts for
the fact that by lowering quality below the socially optimal level, providers can increase proﬁts
on inframarginal consumers, for whom switching to an alternative provider is costly. While the
optimal policy, and its cost, varies by type, the mark-up is independent of the type. Thus, optimal
payments are differentiated by an amount that is independent of the strength of competition.
If payments can be made only on the basis of a partially informative signal, the optimal risk-
based payments should be adjusted according to a simple linear transformation, identiﬁed by
GM00. If there are more signals than types, some indeterminacy arises regarding the coefﬁcients
of this transformation. An important empirical question to be addressed is the estimation of the
probability densities linking types and signals.
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